Kelo v. City of New London

Property rights sit at the crossroads between individual liberty and government power. Few cases illustrate this tension more sharply than Kelo v. City of New London. A woman named Susette Kelo in the City of New London, Connecticut, was told that she would be forced to give her pink house away to city officials if she did not comply with their new development plan. Because New London had been struggling with economic decline and hardship, the city's justification for taking Kelo’s property was to transfer the ownership of homes to economic companies that could revitalize the port town. On the surface, the move was justifiable; a state agency had even gone so far as to call the City a “distressed municipality.” The unemployment rate was high, and the population was severely declining. Pfizer was knocking at the door- literally- with a multi-million dollar deal to set up a new facility in the town. There would be jobs, hope, and of course, money! 


Unfortunately, to accomplish their goals, the city had to destroy Kelo’s property to make room for the town’s new business district. Kelo’s property, however, was not blighted or in poor condition at all; the city had condemned the area encompassing Kelo’s property to be blighted simply because it was located in the development area. The government offered to give Kelo money for the house, which she did not accept due to her love for the house's location near a river. The city refused to back down, leaving Kelo and nine other petitioners no choice but to settle the matter in court. 


The Breakdown: 

Kelo argued that the taking of her property would violate the “public use” restriction in the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment's clause states, “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” This case revolved around the issue of what public use meant conceptually; did public use require the public to literally use the land, or did a broader community benefit suffice? To Kelo, the principle of public use rested on the idea that the land had to be used directly by the public, rather than for the sole purpose of private, commercial gain. 


The city, of course, adopted a broad view of the clause. Public use of the land could include economic revitalization, which the city argued was a public purpose in and of itself. Even though the land would be sold to a private entity, the city's goal was for the private entity to improve the community by providing much-needed jobs. They also appealed to Connecticut state law under Section 8-186 from Connecticut’s Municipal Development Act, which stated, “permitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and improve unified land and water areas… for industrial and business purposes and, in distressed municipalities… are public uses and purposes for which public moneys may be expended.” This legislative declaration was the city's legal shield, and later laid the groundwork which the Supreme Court majority later chose to stand on. 


The Opinion:

The court ruled 5-4 against Kelo. Justice Stevens for the majority found that, “because the plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth amendment.” The Fifth amendment was interpreted to mean that public use could mean public purpose. The court also advocated for deference toward the legislature’s judgment in economic matters, which Justice Stevens also explained: ”Just as we decline to second- guess the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline to second-guess the City’s determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project.” 


O’Connor’s Famous Dissent:

O’Connor, in her dissent, outlines the issue behind the majority's doctrine, which is that the majority's reasoning eliminates any meaningful limit on takings. O’Connor saw the decision as an expansion of the public use clause. She explained that, “incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development takings for public use is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property.” This distinction was especially important because if a city could always argue that a wealthier private owner would generate more tax revenue, then no private property is truly safe from government transfer. She further critiques the court’s deference to the legislatures, by explaining that the original purpose of the clause was to prevent deference to the government’s taking of property. Letting the states have their way is an "abdication of our (the courts’) responsibility.” To her, the court had abandoned a long-held government principle. 



Why This Case Matters: 

After Kelo came out in 2005, it was very controversial. Many citizens on both sides of the political spectrum worried that the court had expanded government power negatively. While Susette Kelo lost the legal battle, she arguably won the war, as states worked to combat the court's ruling, and media companies worked to spread awareness about the case. Within weeks of Kelo, at least 11 states had introduced legislation to restrict eminent domain. State-level protections were implemented to protect the private properties of citizens. Ironically, Kelo’s seized property sat vacant for years, and the development plan failed. While state action ultimately limited the court’s ruling, Kelo v. The City of New London remains a controversial case debated by legal scholars. Kelo’s house was later disassembled, but moved to a new location to be an ever-present reminder of the threat of eminent domain. 


Bibliography: 

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-186 (2023).

Connecticut Public Radio, Little Pink House Hits the Big Screen, Reviving New London Eminent Domain Saga (Apr. 24, 2018), ctpublic.org.

Wyoming Legislative Service Office, Eminent Domain Reform After Kelo (2005).


Full Text Links: 


Key Questions:

Was O’Connor right that Kelo eliminates any meaningful limit on government takings?


Should courts defer to legislatures on what constitutes “public use” or is that an abdication of judicial responsibility?